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Abstract:  Product market reforms are structural reforms of microeconomic type that aim at 
improving the functioning of product markets by increasing competition amongst producers 
of goods and services. Theoretical models suggest that regulation and reforms which liberalise 
or improve the functioning of markets can positively affect productivity through three 
different channels, namely a reallocation of scarce resources (allocative efficiency), an 
improvement in the utilisation of the production factors by firms (productive efficiency) and 
an incentive for firms to innovate to move to the modern technology frontier (dynamic 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Economic literature has largely demonstrated the importance of productivity for economic 
growth and welfare, decomposing GDP per capita into five components (Denis, McMorrow 




















Where H denotes the average number of hours worked, L represents employment; LF is the 
labour force and WAP the working-age population (European Commission, 2000). Among 
these factors, the one that influences economic growth the most over the long term is labour 
productivity since the other factors – labour inputs – cannot be increased infinitely (European 
Commission, 2000). 
 
One way of stimulating productivity growth performances is to enhance competition through 
policies that aim to improve the functioning of product markets by deregulating and 
facilitating entry or the threat of entry (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). These kind of 
measures, which are defined as product market reforms (PMR), are at the heart of the EU 
strategy decided in 2000 in Lisbon to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy with sustainable economic growth and greater social cohesion by 2010. A 
major aim of these reforms is indeed to increase GDP per capita that currently stands for the 
EU-25 at only around 65% of the US level. 
 
Product market reforms impact on economic performance through the stimulation of 
productivity via three main channels of transmission, namely a reallocation of resources 
(allocative efficiency), an improvement in the utilisation of production factors by firms 
(productive efficiency) and an incentive for firms to innovate (dynamic efficiency). However, 
the sequence of their respective impact on productivity growth has rather been overlooked. 
The aim of this paper is to propose such a sequence and to present a review of both the 
theoretical and empirical literatures on these three transmission channels. In the theoretical 
models we refer to, the links between product market reforms and productivity are indirect 
and act through those three channels. We do not cover as such the direct links that may exist 
between product market reforms and productivity. These direct links include for example 
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lower costs of doing business thanks to reduced administrative burden or lower barriers to 
trade. 
 
Section one presents the main conclusions drawn from both the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the links between PMR, allocative efficiency and productivity. Sections two and 
three provide the same elements as regards the two other channels of the productive and 
dynamic efficiency, respectively. Finally, the last section attempts to present a synthetic view 
of the sequence the three channels impact on productivity and to draw some policy 
implications. 
 
1.  P RODUCT MARKET REFORMS, ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY. 
 
Competition leads to reallocation of resources between and inside firms. 
By increasing the number of competitors or the threat of entry of new competitors in each 
market, product market reforms lead to markets that are more competitive. The increase in the 
contestability of markets and the reduction of the incumbent’s market power incite firms to 
set prices closer to marginal costs. As a consequence, mark-ups tend to decrease while the 
allocation of both inputs (labour and capital) and goods is more efficient, i.e. scarce resources 
are allocated to the production of the goods and services so that consumer wants and needs 
are met in a better way than they were in the previous period. More product market 
competition can also lead to increased allocative efficiency as less productive firms exit and 
market share moves from less productive to more productive firms. 
 
Reallocation of resources positively influences performance. 
These theoretical models that focus on the reallocation effects of liberalisation generally 
consider that the latter has a positive impact on economic performance. For instance, Melitz 
(2003) specifies a model with imperfect competition and heterogeneous firms in which 
opening to trade leads to a reallocation of resources towards more productive firms within 
industries. Low productivity firms exit, high productivity firms expand in the domestic market 
and some enter the export market. This leads to an increase in aggregate productivity, even 
when there is no productivity growth within the firms. However, a rise in competition does 
not always lead to increased allocative efficiency. For example, Vickers (1995) points out that 
an increase in competition through more aggressive interactions between firms could increase 
industry concentration in the medium term since more aggressive firm’ behaviour first 
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reallocates profits from inefficient firms to more efficient ones (reallocation effect) and 
subsequently drives out inefficient firms (selection effect). This thereby raises industry 
concentration and mark ups, but this model implies that market entry is not possible for new 
competitors, and so does not present the whole picture. 
 
Empirical studies largely confirm the theoretical analysis. 
Most empirical studies that aimed to test the links between the degree of market opening 
and/or the degree of competition, on the one hand, and the profitability level of firms, on the 
other hand, have found - since the pioneering works of Bain (1951 and 1956) - a negative 
relationship between these two variables, therefore confirming the theoretical analysis 
(Schmalensee, 1989). Jacquemin and Sapir (1991), for instance, showed that national 
industrial sectors in Europe that were protected from intra-EU competition by important non-
tariff barriers benefited in the early 80’s from abnormally high profitability levels. More 
recently, Oliveira Martins et al. (1996) did not find any correlation between the degree of 
market concentration and the level of mark-ups but identified a significant negative 
correlation between entry rates in a market and mark-ups. The European Commission (1996) 
also showed that the implementation of the Single Market Programme led to an increase in 
competitive pressures in the manufacturing industry, resulting, in particular, in reductions in 
the price–cost margins. Allen et al. (1998) shared this conclusion. Griffith and Harrison 
(2004) estimated the relationship between product market reforms and the level of economic 
rents. They found that reforms that ease entry, reduce tariff rates and regulatory barriers to 
trade, remove price controls and reduce public involvement in production negatively affect 
the average level of economic rents in the economy.  
 
Internal restructuring appears to be the driving force behind allocative efficiency. 
Generally, studies analysing the impact of product market reforms on economic performance 
through the process of entry and exit focus for a large part on the link between entry and 
productivity, and generally find a positive link between the two indicators. One can 
decompose the direct impact of free entry and exit in several effects. First, internal 
restructuring (also called “within effect”) refers to productivity growth of individual firms in 
the industry via factors internal to the firm such as organisational change, new technologies, 
or reallocation of inputs. Second, external restructuring represents a reallocation of resources 
among firms via a process of creative destruction with exit of least efficient firms or via a 
shift in market shares towards most efficient firms. Using OECD data, Barnes, Haskell and 
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Maliranta (2001) found substantial within effects. Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) found 
similar results for the US manufacturing firms between 1972 and 1988 with significant impact 
of market share reallocation and only a small contribution of entry and exit. The same 
conclusion came out of research done by Griliches and Regev (1995) who surveyed the Israeli 
industry over 1979-1988. These three studies highlight the importance of within effects in 
impacting productivity growth. 
 
Contestability is key for reallocation to occur in the long-term. 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001) showed the importance of market entry – or more precisely 
the importance of market contestability – as a stimulus for competitive pressures and 
economic performance. In a model in which firms’ and employees’ productivity are fixed and 
in which labour is the only factor of production, they consider the impact of product market 
regulations. In their model, deregulation of product markets can take the form of either 
increased substitutability between goods or a reduction in entry costs. In the short run, 
increased substitutability between goods leads to lower mark ups, reduced unemployment and 
higher real wages. In the long term, the same results occur only if one reduces barriers to 
entry.  If this fails to be the case, then firms exit because of lower level of rents and, as a 
result, mark ups, unemployment and real wages return towards their original levels. In this 
framework, liberalisation through the ease of firm/market entry is thus a major determinant of 
the effectiveness of product market reforms aimed at stimulating competition.  
 
In a landmark study, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) also demonstrated significant links 
between product market policies and productivity performance, with entry liberalisation 
leading to productivity gains in all of the countries considered regardless their position in 
terms of technology adoption. They also found evidence of a twofold effect of entry 
liberalisation that release their effects over a ten years time horizon. First, entry liberalisation 
in the services industries boosts annual multi-factor productivity growth in the overall 
business sector. Second, an indirect (and positive) effect of the removal of trade and 
administrative barriers to entry was found. The intensity of the effect depends on the 
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Product market reforms help to shape business dynamism. 
Entry and exit of firms may in addition also affect allocative efficiency. Several factors 
explain entry and exit of firms. Among those, product market regulations stand out as having 
substantial impact on entry rate of businesses. Using principal component analysis, Cincera 
(2004) found that product market reforms have a positive impact on both entry and exit of 
companies. Brandt (2004) found that overly complicated license and permit system 
discourages the creation of new enterprises. In his study, Brandt used relatively conservative 
estimation techniques and the strong significance of his results is therefore an indication of 
robust findings. This also suggests that other regulations that his technique fails to find having 
statistically significant effects may actually also hinder entrepreneurship. 
 
For example, one has so far rather overlooked the impact of tax policy as a product market 
reform. Business surveys identify differences in corporate tax systems across Europe as being 
a key obstacle to cross-border activities in Europe1. Moreover, some studies suggest a high 
compliance cost related to the lack of co-ordination of tax and accounting systems in Europe2. 
Besides these direct compliance costs, tax systems are known for having a large impact on 
entrepreneurship and on innovation activities, either through the general tax framework or 
through targeted tax policies (Gentry and Hubbard, 2004). The effect of taxation on entry is 
tricky to apprehend because entrepreneurs have the possibility to be self-employed or to 
incorporate3, therefore involving decisions based on both the personal and corporate income 
tax systems. In addition, not only the level but also the convexity of some tax systems – 
mainly the progressivity of personal income tax systems – and the relative difficulties to 
carry-over losses across tax periods – leading in some cases to “success taxes”4 - imply that 
decisions related to entrepreneurship also depend on the predicted level and distribution of 
earnings. Other types of taxation also matter. This is certainly the case for capital gains 
taxation, which has an effect on the level of venture capital supplied to entrepreneurs5. 
                                                 
1  See for example European Business Monitor, 12
th edition, 2002, page 16. Among a list of suggestions, leaders 
from top EU companies quote “further harmonisation of taxes across the EU” as the Single Market Policy that 
would benefit their company the most.  http://ebm.ups.com  
2  See European Commission (2001) and European Commission (2004). 
3  In some cases, incorporation can be made so that entrepreneurs still face personal income taxes. This is for 
example the case of Personenunternehmen, such as the KG companies, in Germany. The design of tax rules will 
also have an impact on productivity through its incentives. This is for example the case for the taxation of 
performance-related pay systems, such as stock options or bonuses.  
4  This is because losses do not lead to negative taxes. Therefore, successful companies usually face a higher 
effective taxation than unsuccessful ones. 
5  A sizeable collateral damage of a lower supply of venture capital is the decrease in managerial advice that 
usually accompanies capital invested in risky activities (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2000). 
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Finally, targeted tax measures – be they in terms of tax credits, specific depreciation rules, 
reduced taxation or preferential exemptions – have a large impact on entrepreneurial 
activities. The large effect of tax policy on entrepreneurial behaviour seems to be confirmed 
by the few studies on the topic6 (e.g. Cullen and Gordon, 2002). 
 
However, allocative efficiency has mainly indirect effects, boosting productive and dynamic 
efficiency. 
The welfare gains achieved by increasing allocative efficiency are not by themselves likely to 
be very large (Harberger, 1954; Leibenstein, 1966; Scherer and Ross, 1990). In fact, 
allocative efficiency gains mainly impact indirectly on economic performance by inciting 
firms to improve their productive efficiency and, although this is still a debated issue in the 
literature, to enhance efforts to innovate and speed up diffusion of innovation.  
 
2.  P RODUCT MARKET REFORMS, PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY. 
 
Productive efficiency forces companies to maximise the use of their resources. 
Productive efficiency is the capacity for any given firm to allocate its resources in such a way 
that makes it possible to reduce or eliminate the under-utilisation of its production factors, i.e. 
capital and labour (Pilat, 1996). Productive efficiency and productivity are not identical 
concepts but they are interrelated (Sharpe, 1995) and a decrease in productive inefficiency can 
be associated with an increase in productivity (Pilat, 1996). In short, productive or technical 
efficiency gains come from the introduction of new or better production methods within the 
firm, including organisational changes.  
 
Competition is likely to increase productive efficiency by reducing managerial slack. 
The process through which competition influences productive efficiency relates to agency 
costs. Indeed, the main impact of higher product market competition on productive efficiency 
that the literature emphasises is the incentive effect on managers and workers to reduce slack, 
trim fat and structure the workplace more efficiently (Griffith and Harrison, 2004). Principal-
agent models under information asymmetry generally assume that managers and workers can 
partially capture monopoly rents to a monopolistic firm in the form of managerial slack, i.e. 
                                                 
6  In addition, the effect of tax systems on foreign direct investment is well-established, adding foreign 
competitors to the level of entry (see for example Clark, 2002). In a meta-analysis study, de Mooij and Ederveen 
(2001) found that the mean value of the tax rate elasticity to FDI was 3.3. 
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lack of efforts. By giving them more incentives for increasing their efforts and improving 
efficiency, competitive pressures may reduce slack so that one can reasonably expect that 
product market competition would discipline firms into efficient operation (Ahn, 2001). This 
is because more competition reduces the agency costs because it allows stakeholders to better 
compare the efforts of managers with those of competitors. Empirically, the works of 
Holmstrom (1982), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), and Mookherjee (1984) suggest that explicit 
incentives schemes will generate sharper incentives the larger the number of players involved. 
Hart (1983) also provides a model of managerial incentives that demonstrates explicitly how 
competition between firms may sharpen incentives. Incentives to improve productive 
efficiency could arise through different channels (Winston, 1993; Meyer and Vickers, 1997; 
Nickel et al., 1997; Aghion and Howitt, 1998): 
 
•  First, competition creates greater opportunities for comparing performance under 
information asymmetry and hence makes it easier for the owners or the market to 
monitor managers; 
•  Second, in highly competitive markets where price elasticity of demand is high, cost-
reducing productivity improvements are likely to generate large increase in market 
shares and profit; 
•  Third, the probability of bankruptcy is likely to be higher in a more competitive 
environment. Consequently, managers have an incentive to step up their efforts to 
avoid such a failure. 
 
Competition may also influence the effort of workers, as they are likely to capture a part of 
product market rents in the form of slack or higher wages. Therefore, there is a direct link 
between the degree of competition and the level of worker’s effort (Nickell, 1996). 
Empirically, Griffith (2001) showed that the increase in product market competition brought 
about by the implementation of the Single Market Programme led to an increase in overall 
levels of efficiency in Europe. However, these efficiency gains occurred more particularly in 
firms where management and ownership were separated (principal-agents type of firms). This 
then suggests that product market competition can play an important role in reducing agency 
costs7. Using American data, Jagannathan and Srinivasan (2000) came to a similar conclusion. 
                                                 
7 Agency costs may be defined as costs induced by decisions taken by managers with the view to increasing their 
personal gratification or to reaching their own personal objectives (use of “free cash-flow”) instead of being 
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Sauner-Leroy (2003) also showed that the rise in competition induced by the implementation 
of the Single Market Programme led EU manufacturing firms to increase their productive 
efficiency to compensate for lower prices and profit margins.  
 
Empirical studies show that competition and contestability increase productive efficiency. 
Empirical studies analysing the links between product market reforms and productive 
efficiency are relatively scarce. The fact that productive efficiency is difficult to measure as it 
depends on various factors, some of them not being observable such as, for instance, 
organisational changes within companies (Sauner-Leroy, 2003) may explain this relative 
scarcity. Empirical works already been done on this issue mostly include studies focusing on 
the relationship between competition and productive efficiency, and not specifically on the 
relationship between product market reforms and productive efficiency. Nevertheless, one can 
argue that as product market reforms tend to increase competition, the conclusions drawn 
from empirical work linking competition and productive efficiency are also valid for the 
analysis of the links between product market reforms and productive efficiency. Caves and 
Barton (1990), Caves et al. (1992) or Green and Mayes (1991) used frontier production 
function techniques to compute efficiency indices and to relate them to competition variables. 
They found that, above a certain threshold, increases in market concentration (i.e. decreases in 
competition) tend to be associated with reductions in technical efficiency. Recently, Cincera 
(2004) found a positive and significant relationship between current firm entry and labour 
productivity growth as well as between exit lagged by two years and labour productivity 
growth. 
 
Studies analysing the direct links between product market reforms (or competition) and 
productivity are more frequent. In particular, a number of empirical studies have sought to test 
the effects of trade liberalisation or of an increase in competition on the productivity level of 
industrial firms. These studies generally conclude that there is a positive relation (Nickell et 
al., 1997), either with respect to the impact of a trade barrier removal (Harrison, 1994; Mac 
Donald, 1994), or with respect to the impact of an increase in competition (Caves and Barton, 
1990; Haskel, 1991; Green and Mayes, 1991; Nickell et al., 1992; Nickell, 1996; Pilat, 1996). 
 
3.  P RODUCT MARKET REFORMS, DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY. 
                                                                                                                                                         
taken in order to maximise the net present value of the firm. Agency costs may also stem from the existence of 
managerial or organisational slack translating into a misuse of human resources. 
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In the long-term, product market reforms also potentially affect dynamic efficiency. 
Gains through allocative and productive efficiency generally represent one-off changes to the 
level of productivity and output and accrue relatively rapidly, i.e. in the short run. However, 
an increase in competition may also act as a stimulus for firms to develop product and process 
innovations and hence to speed up the move to the modern technology frontier. Improvements 
in such dynamic efficiency gains potentially have a much larger impact on productivity but 
are also likely to take much longer to accrue, i.e. successful innovations will eventually raise 
the level and growth rate of total factor productivity in the long run (Ahn, 2002; Griffith and 
Harrison, 2004). However, the link between competition and innovation is a debated issue in 
the theoretical literature.  
 
Schumpeterian models find that competition decreases the incentive for innovation. On the 
opposite, new endogenous growth models find that competition foster innovation. 
 
Theoretical models have different views on the incentives created by increased competition. 
On one hand, in line with the Schumpeterian view of market power and innovation, the early 
endogenous growth and industrial organisation literatures suggested that increased product 
market competition led to reduced innovative activity, as more competition reduced the 
monopoly rents that reward successful innovators. Such results were found in the works of 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992). However, they 
were based on the assumption that innovation was made by outsiders or by new entrants 
competing incumbents with conventional technology and that the payoff of innovation was 
equal to the post-innovation rent (while the pre-innovation rent was zero).  
 
On the other hand, new endogenous growth models - such as the ones developed by Aghion, 
Harris and Vickers (1997), Aghion and Howitt (1998) or Aghion, Harris, Howitt and 
Vickers(2001) - extend the basic Schumpeterian models by allowing incumbents firms to 
innovate and by assuming that innovation incentives mainly depend on the difference between 
the post-innovation and the pre-innovation rents. These models hence predict that more 
product market competition may end up fostering innovation. Aghion and Howitt (1998) offer 
two theoretical cases where competition is indeed conducive to innovation: 
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•  Intensified product market competition could force managers to speed up the adoption 
of new technologies in order to avoid loss of control rights consecutive to bankruptcy. 
Indeed, if successful innovators introducing new technology gain market shares 
because of more efficient production process, they will be able to replace the firms 
producing with the old technology. The latter are thus forced to innovate in order to 
survive (Ahn, 2002). 
•  In ‘neck-and-neck’ industries, i.e. in industries in which oligopolistic firms face 
similar production costs, product market competition will affect largely innovation. 
This is because intense competition increases each firm’s incentive to reduce its 
production costs through the acquisition of a technological lead over its rivals. 
Competition may also increase the incentive of each firm to innovate to escape 
competition if, for instance, innovation translates into more sophisticated and 
differentiated products.  
 
Difficulties to measure dynamic efficiency led to contradictory results. 
The empirical literature on the link between product market competition and innovation has 
so far been relatively sparse and inconclusive. The reasons lay in the poor availability of 
comprehensive time series of product market indicators, in a “still-in-progress” theoretical 
framework, and in the difficulties of measuring dynamic efficiency given that it takes time to 
deliver its full effects and that innovation is difficult to measure. As surveyed by Ahn (2002, 
p.15), studies on the relationship between market power and innovation lead to mixed results. 
For example, some studies show that companies’ size has no significant effects on innovation 
whilst other studies point to either a positive relationship between concentration and 
innovation, or an inverted U-Shaped relationship, or simply no effects when controlling for 
industry differences. Apparently, measurement and modelling issues blur empirical results as 
good proxies for innovation are difficult to find and regression methods fail to take into 
account “bounds” effects between R&D intensity and concentration8.  
 
                                                 
8  The “bounds approach” has been developed by John Sutton (see Sutton, 2002). Sutton looks at the 
determinants of market concentration and finds lower bounds for concentration. For example, R&D can allow 
firms to differentiate their products and therefore more R&D can lead to less concentration. Furthermore, Sutton 
would assume that as R&D grow, market size matter less. Besides his focus on a lower bound, he also stresses 
that the relationship between concentration and market size is weaker for endogenous sunk costs that grow with 
market size such as research and development than for exogenous sunk costs. His work attempted to connect the 
analysis of concentration with the identification of the intensity of price competition and the level of endogenous 
sunk costs as the key determinants. 
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The dominant effect probably depends on the type of industries and the technological gap. 
In Schumpeterian models, the link between competition and innovation is ambiguous, as this 
link is prone to be positive in ‘neck-and-neck’ industries whereas it is prone to be negative in 
less ‘neck-and-neck’ - or more ‘product-differentiated’- industries. In the latter type of 
industries indeed, more competition may reduce innovation as the laggard’s reward to 
catching up with the technological leader may fall (Schumpeterian effect). Moreover, by 
increasing innovation incentives relatively more in ‘neck-and-neck’ industries than in 
‘product-differentiated’ industries, an increase in product market competition will tend to 
reduce the fraction of ‘neck-and-neck’ industries in the economy in equilibrium. This effect 
reinforces the Schumpeterian effect in inducing a negative correlation between product 
market competition and aggregate productivity growth or aggregate rate of innovations 
(Aghion et al., 2002).  
 
By introducing entry into such a type of model, Aghion et al (2003a) show that the effect of 
an increase in competition through (the treat of) entry depends on the country, industry or 
firm’s distance to the world technological frontier. In countries that are close to the world 
technological frontier, fostering entry or competition will increase incumbents’ incentives to 
innovate in order to escape potential entrants or new competitors. However, in countries or 
industries lagging far behind the world technological frontier, higher entry or higher 
competition tends to discourage incumbents from innovating. This model thus suggests that 
the overall impact of trade liberalisation will depend on the current state of technology in the 
country or the industry. However, in the long run, trade liberalisation will increase the overall 
average growth rate because in equilibrium there will be more industries where the affect is 
positive. 
 
As predicted by the theoretical literature, the type of industry may matter. Acs and Audretsch 
(1987) found that different types of industries would produce innovative advantage for 
different sizes of industries. Small companies have innovative advantages in highly 
innovative and skilled-intensive sectors whereas large companies enjoy this advantage in 
more concentrated and capital-intensive industries. Using firm-level UK data, Blundell, 
Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) found that firms with higher market share innovated more but 
that at the industry level, more competitive industries were more innovative. Therefore, 
aggregate competition leads to more innovation but within the competitive industries 
dominant firms innovate more often. One difficulty is the possible endogeneity of market 
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structure as it may itself be the result of innovation. In addition, although affecting R&D 
investment, regulations do not seem to be its main driver – some forms of protection could 
even be beneficial for risky R&D activities – and market size and education appear to be more 
pronounced determinants (European Commission, 2003)9.  
 
Market contestability appears to be a condition for dynamic efficiency. 
The direct link between competition and dynamic efficiency measured by productivity growth 
seems to be clear. Nickell (1996) found a positive impact of competition on firm-level TFP 
growth and Disney et al. (2000) found that external competition is an important determinant 
of internal restructuring, which in turn has an impact on TFP growth. In terms of relative 
importance, the authors distinguish between 'internal' restructuring (i.e. new technology and 
organizational change) and 'external' restructuring (i.e. entry of efficient firms and exit of least 
efficient ones) and find that 'external restructuring' accounts for 90% of TFP growth. Griffith 
and Harrison (2004) also find a non-linear relationship between competition and the growth 
rate of labour productivity or total factor productivity. When looking at the evolution of 
competition and the indicators of macroeconomic performance within countries, the authors 
find a negative relationship (i.e. more competition decreases performance). However, this 
finding has to be balanced by possible measurement errors and lag effects. Indeed, when 
comparing across countries the authors find the expected positive relationship (i.e. countries 
with more competition have better performance)10. This positive effect shown by the between-
estimator can be seen as the long-term effect, while the within-estimator captures short-term 
decreases in average productivity as liberalisation is found to increase employment and this 
can bring less-than-average-skilled workers on the job market. Several studies also found a 
significant elasticity of R&D to tax credit, even more so in the long term (see European 
Commission, 2002a for a discussion).  
 
Innovation spurs total factor productivity growth. 
                                                 
9  One important determinant of innovation is skills and education as suggested by Rao et al. (2002) and Aghion 
and Cohen (2004). Griffith and Simpson (2003) found that foreign-owned manufacturing firms in Britain have 
higher levels of labour productivity and investment per employee. Their results suggest that the higher 
proportion of skilled workers in foreign-owned industries matches differences in labour productivity. 
10  Technically, the difference between the two techniques relates to the presence or not of ‘country fixed 
effects’ variables that are there to capture country-specific features which are not observable but may explain 
better performance and the use or not of the average over time. The authors do not just look across countries 
because there is always a theoretical risk that country-specific non-observable features other than the level of 
competition may influence macroeconomic performance and that this impact could be wrongly attributed to the 
level of competition. 
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A positive effect of innovation on dynamic efficiency finds additional empirical support. Rao 
et al. (2001) found a strong correlation between innovation and TFP growth in Canadian 
manufacturing industries, whilst Wieser (2001) confirmed a positive and significant 
contribution of R&D to productivity growth. The R&D output elasticity could however 
depend on sectors. Looking at manufacturing firms in Taiwan, Wang and Tsai (2003) found 
that whilst average output elasticity stood at .18, this effect was larger in high-tech firms. In 
addition, the effects of R&D on TFP performance may appear with long lags and investment 
in ICT could even be associated with lower TFP in the short-run as resources and energy are 
diverted to reorganisation and learning as suggested by Basu et al. (2003). Aiginger (2004) 
found that EU Member States that carried out a liberalisation strategy and invested in the 
same time in knowledge production have done better on average. 
 
However, the relationship between competition and innovation may be of a non-linear nature. 
Finally, a work by Aghion et al. (2002) suggests that the relationship between competition 
and innovation may be of a non-linear nature, with both very high and very low levels of 
product market competition providing lower incentives to innovation. Using a Schumpeterian 
growth model in which firms innovate step by step (i.e. a laggard firm must first innovate to 
catch up with the technological leader before becoming itself a leader in the future), where 
both technological leaders and their followers engage in R&D activities, and where 
competition may increase the incremental profit from innovating while reducing innovation 
incentives for laggards, these authors indeed predict that the relationship between competition 
and innovation is an inverted U-shape, i.e. the escape competition effect dominates for low 
initial levels of competition, whereas the Schumpeterian effect dominates at higher levels of 
competition. 
 
To sum up, the new endogenous growth models predict that the link between competition and 
innovation may be positive or negative depending on the initial state of competition (‘neck-
and neck’ industries versus ‘product-differentiated’ industries and more generally low level of 
competition versus high degree of competition) and on the country, industry or firm’s initial 
distance to the world technological frontier.  
 
Empirical studies confirm the non-linear relationship between competition and innovation. 
There is however increasing evidence of U-shaped relationship between competition and 
R&D or innovation, as predicted by most recent models (Aghion et al. 2002). Griffith and 
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Harrison (2004) looked at the link between microeconomic reforms in product markets on 
macroeconomic performance through their effects on mark-ups. The authors use a two-step 
approach to link product market reforms and macroeconomic performance. They first identify 
the link between indicators of product market reforms and economic rents measured by mark-
ups. In a second step, they use the predicted mark-up to assess the effect on macroeconomic 
variables. The authors relate R&D expenditures with the predicted mark-up from the first 
regression (indirect effect), its squared value, and policy indicators (direct effect). Their 
results suggest a non-linear relationship between competition and the levels of R&D 
expenditure. However, they find an inverted-U-shape relationship between mark-ups and 
R&D that only turns downwards at high levels of regulations. Direct effects of regulation 
appear to be stronger – although with a negative sign. 
 
Recently, the literature has underlined differential effects of innovation on productivity 
growth depending on the distance to the technological frontier. As mentioned earlier, Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta (2003) use an endogenous growth model to integrate productivity growth and 
catch-up so that product market regulations will both directly and indirectly (through 
interacting them with the distance to the technological frontier) impact on TFP growth. They 
found a positive impact of entry on TFP growth, especially in services. These gains seem to 
be larger the further an economy lies away from the technological frontier. Aghion et al. 
(2003b) looked at the effects of reforms on trade in India and found the opposite effect. The 
authors found that Indian States that were close to the technological frontier and had 
liberalised labour markets enjoyed a positive impact of trade liberalisation on growth, whilst 
the opposite holds for Indian States that lay far from this frontier.  
 
In the end, the impact of competition on innovation and productivity takes complex forms 
Finally, there is consistent evidence of the importance of technological spillover (Guellec and 
Van Pottelsberghe, 2001; Bernstein 1996) and of high social rates of return on research and 
development (Jones and Williams, 1998; Griffith, 2000). In addition, R&D expenditures have 
an impact on productivity through two channels: innovation and imitation of other’s 
discoveries (Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen, 2000). The diversity of these findings 
suggests that, although positive, the impact of competition on innovation and productivity 
takes complex forms. 
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Summing up the transmission channels. 
Channels Main  results 
Allocative efficiency.  •  Product market reforms increase competition and usually 
reduce economic rents (mark-ups) through a reallocation of 
resources across firms and, most importantly, inside firms. 
•  This reallocation of resources positively influences 
productivity performance, either directly or, indirectly, by 
boosting productive and dynamic efficiency. 
•  Product market reforms have substantial impact on entry and 
exit rate of business. Market contestability appears to be a 
necessary condition for the reallocation process to occur. 
Productive efficiency.  •  Increase in competition is associated with increase in 
technical or productive efficiency, forcing firms to optimise 
the use of available resources. 
•  Product market competition reduces managerial slack and 
increases workers’ efforts, raising productive efficiency. 
Dynamic efficiency.  •  In the long-term product market reforms also potentially 
affect dynamic efficiency through innovation. More 
competition usually leads to TFP growth but with long lags 
and mostly through creative destruction. 
•  Schumpeterian models find that competition reduces the 
rents and hence the incentives to innovate. On the opposite, 
new endogenous growth models find that competition 
increases the incentives to innovate to escape competition. 
•  There is evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between competition and innovation, with too little or too 
much competition reducing innovation. In addition, the 
technological gap and the type of industry will influence the 
incentives for innovation. 
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Overall impact of pro-competitive product market reforms on productivity. 
 
  Product market reforms 
Deregulation, liberalisation, trade 
openness 
Competition 
Opening up of markets                                     Entry and threat of entry 
 
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY  PRODUCTIVE 
EFFICIENCY 
DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 
*Downward pressure on prices and 
mark-ups 
*Within-firm reallocation 
*Incentive to innovate to escape 
competition  *Incentive to reduce both slack 
and costs  *Inverted U-curve relationship 
between competition and innovation  *Across firms reallocation  *Internal restructuring 
Increase in  
Total Factor Productivity  Increase in technical efficiency 
(K and L productivity) 
LONG-TERM EFFECTS  SHORT-TERM / MEDIUM TERM EFFECTS 
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4.  C ONCLUSIONS. 
 
Product market reforms have been a pillar of economic policy in the European Union. Starting 
with the removal of trade barriers between 1958 and 1968, measures to open up markets to 
competition have been pursued with the implementation of the Single Market Programme by 
the end of 1992. Today, product market reforms remain a key element of the Lisbon strategy 
and in particular of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. 
 
Although these reforms may have a direct impact on the cost of doing business, most of their 
effects actually translate into productivity increases through three transmission channels. 
These three channels depend heavily on the competition effects that product market reforms 
unleash by means of opening up markets to domestic and foreign competitors, removing 
hurdles to business activities, and levelling the playing field among businesses. Competition 
immediately puts pressure on the economic rents and creates incentives to companies to both 
reallocate (allocative efficiency) and use (productive efficiency) their resources in the most 
efficient way. Those changes that are internal to the firm drive capital and labour productivity 
increases. Although reallocation of resources via entry and exit does not seem to be the 
dominant effect, contestability of the markets is a necessary condition for allocative and 
productive efficiency to sustain in the long-term. In addition, contestability plays an essential 
role in enhancing dynamic efficiency through creative destruction. Although the relationship 
is of non-linear nature and depends on the type of industries and on the technological gap, 
competition generally forces competitors to innovate. This in turn raises productivity growth 
in the long-term.  
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Appendix I: definition of product market reforms 
Product market reforms are structural reforms of microeconomic type that aim to improve the 
functioning of product markets by increasing competition among producers of goods and 
services. There are four types of measures that may be taken to reform product markets: 
•  First, measures to open up markets (goods and services) that were previously sheltered 
from competition from abroad by tariff barriers (trade openness) or legal 
barriers (liberalisation).  
•  Second, measures to open up markets that were previously sheltered from 
competition from newcomers – whatever their origin –  because of stringent 
regulations on entry, such as permits and licences, or non-tariff barriers, such as 
specific national regulations (deregulation).  
•  Third,  measures to create a more business-friendly environment, such as the 
reduction of time and costs to set up a new company. 
•  Fourth, measures that seek to reduce the State’ involvement in the economy, since 
this is likely to disturb the well functioning of markets (ad hoc State aid, subsidies and 
State-owned firms competing with private firms). 
The implementation of the Single Market Programme was intended to abolish all barriers to 
the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital within the European Union by the 
end of 1992. This programme constitutes the most recent comprehensive exercise of product 
market reform. The 1988 Cecchini report sought to measure the foreseeable effects of these 
measures. Notably, it considered that the expected economic gains from the completion of the 
internal market would stem from the intensification of competition between producers, from 
efficiency gains resulting from the reduction of trade barriers and from economies of scale 
induced by the expansion of markets. This would lead to the intensification of competition on 
the goods and services markets together with the realisation of productivity gains that were 
supposed to translate into lower product prices. This in turn would lead to a virtuous circle of 
reduction of inflationary pressures, increases in consumers’ purchasing power, and 
stimulation of demand favourable to GDP growth in Europe. 
Major reforms that have affected European countries not only include the range of Single 
Market measures but also liberalisation and regulatory reform in network industries, reduction 
in state aids, reforms of competition policy, entry requirements and privatizations (Griffith 
and Harrison, 2004). 
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Appendix II: Measure of the mark up 
Numerous studies using macroeconomic databases have sought to measure the level of mark-
ups within the manufacturing industry of various countries. Studies using macroeconomic 
databases generally make use of econometric techniques for estimating the mark-up ratio. 
Based on the methodology used for calculating total factor productivity, the so-called Solow 
residual, this technique consists of using a regression analysis with an output as dependent 
variable and the production factors, or inputs, as explanatory variables. The residual of the 
equation is a proxy of the Lerner index (B = p-mc/p)11  which is a traditional indicator 
measuring the degree of competition. This methodology, first proposed by Hall (1986 and 
1988), supplemented by Domowitz et al. (1988) then modified by Roeger (1995), makes it 
possible to estimate indirectly the mark-up ratio12  (Oliveira Martins et al., 1996).  
 
However, as the marginal cost is unobservable, one generally uses average variable cost as a 
proxy for marginal cost (Ahn, 2002) and – because one assumes that returns to scale are 
constant - estimates of the mark-up based on Roeger’s method are in fact estimates of the 
difference between price and average costs (Oliveira Martins et al., 1996). Another way of 
calculating the mark-up is to compute a profit mark-up indicator as the ratio of gross value 
added over unit labour costs. However, this indicator is only a crude approximation, as it does 
not take into consideration corporate taxes and interest payments (European Central Bank, 
2004). 
 
Some authors, using accounting and financial databases, use average cost, or even variable 
cost, as a proxy of marginal cost and calculate either a direct measure of the Lerner index 
(Nickell, 1996; Aghion et al., 2002), or a direct measure of the mark-up by calculating the 
"turnover/variable cost" ratio from aggregated accounting data (Griffith, 2001). Others use the 
ratio of gross operating profit over value added (Rivaud-Danset et al., 2001). This way of 
computing the mark-up ratio, i.e. by using the average costs, seems to be consistent with 
business practices as regards price setting. Indeed, surveys conducted within UK (Hall et al., 
2000) or American firms (Blinder et al., 1998) have shown that production costs, i.e. unit 
costs, were more widely used for price setting than marginal cost.  
 
                                                 
11 B: Lerner index; p = prices; mc = marginal cost.  
12 The relation between the mark-up and the Lerner index is as follows: p/mc = 1/ (1-B).  
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If high profit levels can be interpreted as a consequence of low competitive pressures, in 
contrast they can also result from efficient behaviour of firms (Ahn, 2002). For instance, 
Demsetz (1974) considered that high profit levels within an industry can be explained by 
good performances of firms, i.e. their ability - mainly for largest firms - to produce at low 
costs. In the same vein, Boone (2000) showed that an increase in competition does not 
necessarily translate into a reduction of mark-ups in particular for the most efficient firms. 
More generally, an increase in competition may have more effects on prices than on profits, 
and therefore the mark-up may remain stable while prices may fall. Geroski et al. (1996) 
showed in particular that this is likely to occur because incumbent firms have excess costs –
such as managerial slack or rent sharing with the workforce - which can be reduced to 
compensate for lower prices. This latter argument could be a good explanation for the paradox 
mentioned by Konings et al. (2001) concerning the levels of mark-ups in the Dutch 
manufacturing sectors facing high import rates. The authors found mark-ups to be higher in 
these sectors than in sectors where import rates were low. If the intensity of competition 
results in a fall in costs that is larger than the fall in prices, then profit (the price-cost margin) 
increases. 
 
As the effects of competition on the mark-up ratio may be ambiguous, its evolution over time 
has to be analysed simultaneously with the evolution of its two components, namely prices 
and unit costs (Bils, 1987; Machin and Van Reenen, 1993). Applying this methodology to 
analyse the impact of the implementation of the Single Market Programme has had on mark 
ups in the European manufacturing industry, Sauner-Leroy (2003) found evidence that profit 
margins of EU firms in the early 1990’s declined in line with a decrease in real prices. He 
found that this phenomenon could be at least partly attributable to increased competition 
stemming from intra-EU imports, thus indicating the realisation of allocative efficiency gains 
induced by the intra-EU trade liberalisation. 
 